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Cultural Heritage, Crisis, and Community Crime Prevention in Nepal 
 
Abstract 
Following Nepal's 2015 earthquake there was speculation that sacred art would be looted 
from the ruins of severely damaged temples due to breakdown in formal security. 
Although pillage did not immediately occur, the months following the earthquake have 
seen the theft of sacred heritage items. As Nepali sacred art remains under threat of theft, 
we explore the processes by which government intervention can be destructive of the 
community dynamic that maintains local crime prevention on an informal and unofficial 
level. Can situational crime prevention measures when imposed in a top-down fashion 
upon communities by state actors be corrosive of collective efficacy, and therefore 
ultimately self-defeating in crime prevention terms? The case of post-quake Nepal seems 
to suggest that the answer to this question is, in some circumstances, yes. 
 
 
Introduction: community heritage crime prevention and the earthquake in Nepal 
On 25 April 2015 a 7.8 to 8.1 magnitude earthquake hit central Nepal. Nearly 9,000 
people were killed and 22,000 injured in the quake and its major aftershocks and 
hundreds of thousands of people lost their homes to landslide and collapse. Significant 
portions of the heritage sites of the Kathmandu Valley and beyond were damaged or 
destroyed. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake there was intense speculation 
that sacred art would be looted, resulting in a flurry of panicked reports in the Nepali and 
international media. This assumption of vulnerability is not unfounded as the quake 
should have created the sort of complete security breakdown that allows for undetected 
theft. Such speculation proved incorrect. No sacred art theft was recorded in the 
immediate aftermath of the earthquake, either by the government, by preservation NGOs, 
or by communities. A year and a half after the quake, however, thefts of sacred art from 
Nepali sites appear to be escalating. What explains this post-disaster period of heritage 
site integrity, followed by an escalating crime rate in relation to site thefts more than a 
year later?  
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The answer, we suggest, lies in the nexus of effects of government-mandated formal legal 
and crime prevention measures on the one hand, and on the other hand the local cultural 
protective informal social control regimes of populations living near sacred sites and 
using them as part of their cultural practices. In other words, ‘law’ has at times interfered 
with, rather than supported, ‘order’ in this situation. Progressive community-level 
activities have been disrupted by forms of legal cultural heritage protectionism that have 
not adequately recognized the important role local people have been playing in post-
disaster heritage protection. Government legal and situational crime prevention initiatives 
have in some cases replaced the collective efficacy of local communities in deterring art 
thefts from sacred sites, in other cases complemented them, and in other cases still, 
eroded them. This paper seeks to examine more closely this range of interactions between 
formal and informal social control measures (i.e. between the law on one hand and on the 
other the extra-legal or sub-legal crime-preventive social routines of local communities), 
in the context of the recovery period after a natural disaster.  
 
In terms of the three categories of interaction listed above between formal (state) and 
informal (community) crime controls – replacement, complementarity, and erosion – the 
first two are reasonably uncomplicated and we will examine their evolution in the case 
study in question. The latter form of interaction, erosion, is the more quixotic and we can 
begin to unravel some of the theoretical possibilities involved in that process now, to set 
the context for a full understanding of the post-quake heritage protection scene in Nepal 
to follow.   
 
Collective efficacy has emerged as a concept from studies of the relationship between 
social disorganization and crime, broadly drawing together two separate but mutually 
compatible ideas: informal social control and social cohesion.1 Informal social control 
refers to social actions that encourage and support conformity with the law, including 
proactive bystander interventions as well as more passive and routine community or peer 
group norm-setting and –enforcing activities. Social cohesion is a measure of the 
‘closeness’ of a community or social group, in terms of the nature of social bonds and in 
                                                     
1 Gau, "Unpacking Collective Efficacy". 
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particular the ‘willingness of members of a society to cooperate with each other in order 
to survive and prosper’. 2  Research has produced persuasive evidence that collective 
efficacy (the variable constructed out of ‘informal social control’ and ‘social cohesion’) 
acts as a mediator between concentrated disadvantage and crime rates at the 
neighborhood level.3 The proposition is that collective efficacy measures the extent to 
which people would intervene to exercise a degree of control aimed at preventing crime 
locally. Highly collectively efficacious neighborhoods therefore experience lower crime 
rates because they are more able to mobilize a variety of social resources to identify, 
deter, or reduce crime.4 
 
By contrast, situational crime prevention (SCP) looks to target hardening and changes to 
the physical environment which can protect objects, sites and areas against crime. The 
theory is quite functional in orientation: it is about reducing opportunities for crime 
through changes to the settings in which those crimes take place. It may be seen to have a 
relationship with informal social control where, for example in Crime Prevention 
Through Environmental Design (CPTED) buildings or areas are specifically planned to 
be built to minimize blind spots and increase natural surveillance by users of the space. It 
may also have a relationship to the higher-level concept of collective efficacy if, for 
example, communities mobilize to demand SCP measures, or perhaps alternatively the 
use of SCP lowers neighborhood fears and anxieties to the extent that collective efficacy 
becomes a more realistic prospect, as prosocial community interactions are more freely 
undertaken, and previously closed and guarded social actors begin to open up to their 
social surroundings.  
 
The interesting question that emerges in the present case study is whether situational 
crime prevention measures, when imposed in a top-down fashion upon communities by 
state actors, albeit with the best intentions, can be corrosive of collective efficacy, and 
therefore ultimately self-defeating in crime prevention terms. The case of post-quake 
Nepal seems to suggest that the answer to this question is, in some circumstances, yes. If 
                                                     
2 Stanley, “What Do We Know about Social Cohesion”. 
3 Sampson, "Collective Efficacy Theory". 
4 Sampson, "Neighbourhood and Community". 
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collective efficacy holds that ‘mutual trust and commonly held values unlock a 
community’s latent capacity to self-regulate and to prevent crime and disorder’5 then 
what are the processes by which government intervention in terms of well-meaning crime 
prevention initiatives can be destructive of that community dynamic which maintains the 
fabric of local crime prevention on an informal and unofficial level? In post-disaster 
Nepal we see the social effects of environmental-legal interventions as sometimes 
diminishing rather than enhancing local protective regimes in respect of heritage sites and 
objects that have historically been exercised and maintained as part of the cultural and 
religious daily practices at the community level of living with, using, and worshiping 
Hindu and Buddhist deities in the form of statuary.  
 
Nepal’s social and cultural heritage 
Nepal is a landlocked country that runs along the spine of the Himalaya, sharing borders 
with India to the south, east and west, and Tibet to the north. Known best as a high 
mountain country, Nepal also extends into the lowland jungle regions making it a country 
of sharp contrasts. Hinduism and Buddhism are the two primary religions of the country, 
with Hinduism representing 81.34% and Buddhism representing a visible minority at 
9.04% of the country's 26.5 million people according to the 2011 census.6 Both have long 
histories in Nepal and, accordingly, are both represented in several thousand years of 
sacred art and architecture.7 Temples and shrines are Nepal's most iconic heritage sites. 
They are equally valued as so-called World Heritage, as can be seen in the listing of 
many of the Kathmandu Valley's sacred and royal precincts on the UNESCO World 
Heritage List,8 and as living sacred locations that are in constant use by devotees. The 
sheer number of religious heritage sites and amount of sacred art in the country cannot be 
understated; Schick, while documenting the vulnerability of sacred sites, likened the 
whole Kathmandu Valley to "a large open-air museum".9 Ancient sculptures can be found 
in small shrines along every roadside and in every neighborhood courtyard. Villages have 
                                                     
5 Gau, "Unpacking Collective Efficacy"; Sampson et al. "Neighbourhoods and Violent Crimes". 
6 Nepal, Census Info Nepal. 
7 Bangdel, Stolen Images of Nepal, 23. 
8 UNESCO, Kathmandu Valley. 
9 Schick, The Gods are Leaving the Country, 15. 
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several temples and sacred sites, many of them ancient. Cities have thousands. Most are 
at least nominally protected by the country's heritage law. Most are in use.  
 
There is a long and documented history of antiquities theft in Nepal, specifically pieces of 
sacred art stolen to meet the demands of the western, and now eastern, art market. This 
demand increased in the 1960s and 1970s when pop versions of both Hinduism and 
Buddhism entered into the Western mainstream. Much of the early work on the theft of 
sacred cultural objects from Nepal was conducted by the late and revered scholar Lain S. 
Bangdel.10 As an art historian with a specialty in Nepal's sacred art, Bangdel was witness 
to what he records as a massive exodus of Nepali sacred art onto the international market 
in the 1970s and 1980s. Revisiting sites he had photographed in the past, Bangdel was 
able to not only show that certain objects were missing, but he was able to identify them 
in foreign private and public collections. All of the pieces identified by Bangdel as 
missing were stolen and exported in violation of Nepal's Ancient Monuments Protection 
Act of 1956; Cultural property that left Nepal after 1956 without an official government 
export permit is, unambiguously, illegal.11 
 
There is some indication of high-level involvement in antiquities and rare commodities 
smuggling from Nepal during this time and through the 1990s, with feasible allegations 
made of extended royal family and elite corruption as a facilitating factor. Sources close 
to Bangdel at this time report that he faced death threats for his work on the topic of 
sacred art theft and seeking the return of stolen sacred art in foreign collections was rarely 
a government priority. At this time, post-1951, the Police service were controlled directly 
by the Ministry of Home Affairs, ensuring non-investigation of crime related to corrupt 
elites. To some observers, "the police service were reduced to being a mere onlooker to 
crimes ranging from rape [...] to the theft of idols".12 This situation shifted into the 2000s 
with the changes in the country's political structures and some limited successes in anti-
corruption measures, but since the earthquake, Nepal has fallen from an already poor 
place in various global corruption measures with Transparency International, for 
                                                     
10 e.g. Bangdel, Stolen Images of Nepal. 
11 Nepal, Ancient Monument Preservation Act 2013 (1956 AD) [Fifth Amendment]. 
12 Batt, "Public Security Challenges,” 121. 
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example, rating it as "highly corrupt". Furthermore, as Bhatt notes, Nepal's "judiciary is 
not very effective in awarding severe punishment to those who are involved in these 
kinds of activities, because of its long-highlighted link with political and power elites".13  
 
In an effort to reform the image of the Police and related civil structures, community 
policing has been a government initiative since 1982, with the introduction of 
neighborhood police who were meant to be seen as more approachable.14  While the 
intentions were positive, the intended cooperation between local and traditional authority 
structures and civil administration did not materialize in many locations, particularly 
during and after the Maoist insurgency when government-level administration could not 
extend in to many communities. The police are still perceived as corrupt and as engaging 
in 'regular extortion'.15 
 
Within this political context many Nepali individuals and communities harbor a deep 
distrust of the government and government institutions, particularly those located outside 
their local context. For example, from a survey of nearly 2000 households conducted 
before the earthquake, Askvik et al. found that public trust is high for local institutions 
such as schools, hospitals, and village development committees, but low for the courts, 
the civil service, parliament, and government.16 Hopeful predictions for a move towards 
stronger institutions and increased public trust in non-local government has likely been 
dashed by the government's inability to respond adequately to the long term effects of the 
earthquake17 with confidence at such a low level that prime minister K. P. Sharma Oli 
resigned in July 2016, ending his "struggling" nine-month-old government ahead of a no 
confidence vote.18 It is within this climate of weak government, local distrust of distant 
authorities, and ongoing insecurity through perceived police corruption, that post-
earthquake heritage preservation decisions are being made, preservation policy is being 
enforced, and, potentially, new heritage legislation is being crafted. 
                                                     
13 Batt, "Public Security Challenges,” 118–119. 
14 Batt, "Public Security Challenges,” 122. 
15 Batt, "Public Security Challenges,” 122. 
16 Asvick et al., " Citizens’ trust in public and political institutions in Nepal," 14. 
17 e.g. Dolker, "Earning back the people's trust". 
18 Sharma, " Nepal’s Prime Minister, K. P. Sharma Oli, Resigns". 
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Contrasting priorities in the sacred heritage spaces of Nepal 
The dichotomy between formal security (government-level legislation and regulation) 
and alternative or informal networks of community-level security (the forms and 
mechanisms of which are alluded to further below) is, perhaps, reflected in the conflicting 
preservation needs of many heritage sites. This is certainly the case at heritage sites 
throughout the developing and developed world, and Nepal, the focus of this paper, is a 
clear example. The challenges that Nepal faces in protecting its sacred heritage sites are a 
study in contrasting stakeholder needs with little room for compromise.  
 
At the heart of this discussion is the tension caused by competing interests at sites of 
sacred heritage, particularly those within the Kathmandu Valley UNESCO World 
Heritage Site. Nepal's temples and shrines must, at the same time, be: 
 
1. Sites of Preservation: The sites have been formally judged to be significant to all 
humanity, to be 'World Heritage' beyond the state-level context of Nepal. Thus they 
must be preserved to an international standard, largely defined by such 
intergovernmental organizations as UNESCO, which have been criticized as being 
overly 'Western' in construction. In other words, an emphasis on preservation of 
physical, built objects over any intangible heritage uses. 
2. Sites of Tourism: The sites are a significant tourist attraction and, alongside outdoor 
sports which are intermingled with visits to sacred sites, are the primary reason that 
most foreigners visit Nepal. Tourism is one of Nepal's most important industries 
and there is immense pressure on government preservation authorities to present 
sacred heritage sites in a manner that tourists expect; a need that has taken a 
significant hit since the 2015 earthquake. 
3. Sites of Worship: The sites, as the homes of living gods or as direct portals to the 
divine, are part of the vibrant religious and social identities of Nepal's communities 
and of individual Nepali's.19 Removal of significant ancient sculptures to museums, 
locking or blocking access to parts of temples, and preventing the application of 
                                                     
19 e.g. Bangdel, Stolen Images of Nepal; Schick, The Gods are Leaving the Country. 
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food and other offerings to pieces of sacred art in the name of preservation and 
security challenge the central role that sacred art plays in the daily life of many 
Nepalis. 
 
Simplified to its most basic form, the needs of government-level preservation authorities, 
which we can consider as associated with written and formal security policy, may 
contrast with the needs of religious communities, which we can associate with non-legal 
community-level security associated with day-to-day use at sacred heritage sites. The 
official security powers naturally prioritize the preservation of heritage objects and the 
prevention of theft. Religious communities prioritize cultural use and access. On the 
ground, this may become a controversy over, for example, locking temple doors or 
moving idols from shrines into museums for safekeeping and/or tourism purposes. 
Official security powers require the documentation of cultural property, as inventories 
improve security planning and assist in recovery following theft. Religious communities 
may consider such handling to be sacrilegious and often have a complete ban on 
photographing what they consider to be living gods. The same cultural objects must be, 
under the law, preserved by the state, and must serve their cultural function to the public, 
both under the spectre of poverty and extreme international art market demand. 
Lawmakers, heritage professionals, and community members, then, are forced to make 
nearly impossible choices about which set of these values they give primacy to. On paper, 
the government approach is clearly a stronger presence. In practice, the community 
protection-through-use has the greater social effect.  
 
Nepal’s formal heritage protection framework 
The primary legislative tool that concerns the security of sacred art in Nepal is the 
Ancient Monument Preservation Act, 2013[1956],20 which was amended various times, 
most recently in 2052 (1992 AD). It defines ancient monuments as any of a number of 
structures including temples, stupas, etc. that are over 100 years old and archaeological 
objects, including all sacred art, that too is over 100 years old. The government may 
declare any place to be a preserved monument. To modify or use these monuments in any 
                                                     
20 Nepal uses the Bikram Samvat calendar so 2013 is AD 1956. 
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way requires permission from the government via the Department of Archaeology, except 
explicitly in section 3(5) "to conduct and perform traditional dancing and singing or 
organize a fair or festival,” in other words certain but not all religious uses require no 
prior permission.  
 
The Act classifies ancient monuments into three categories: those of local importance, 
those of national importance, and those of international importance, with those of 
international importance being granted the most state-level protection. With regard to 
ownership, the Act recognizes two types of ancient monuments: public ancient 
monuments and private ancient monuments. The Department of Archaeology owns 
public ancient monuments and is charged with conserving them. Private ancient 
monuments must be conserved by their owner, which may be an ‘institution’21 or an 
individual, but the Department of Archaeology retains the right to conserve privately 
owned monuments of national and international importance themselves and to mandate 
that conservation. Owners must seek Department of Archaeology approval before 
modifying the features of any ancient monument. Temples, which in many cases are 
treated as private ancient monuments, are required to use up to fifty percent of offerings 
and donations to fund conservation of the structure and grounds. 
 
The government claims in section 4(1) of the Act the right to purchase any ancient 
monument "if it deems necessary from the point of view of protection of the monument". 
It can, through the Chief Archaeology officer, force the owner of a private ancient 
monument to enter into a deed of responsibility to preserve the site; refusal to enter into 
the deed results in a local official being named as responsible for the site. This deed states 
what level of security the owner must provide and may list supervision responsibilities, 
the hiring of guards, a prohibition against alterations or object removals, and a ban on 
sale or transfer of the monument. Failure to abide by a deed of responsibility may result 
in the Department of Archaeology assuming ownership of the monument without 
payment to the owner. Local chiefs are charged with inventorying archaeological objects 
                                                     
21 ‘Individual’ and ‘Institution’ are the terms used in the Act. It is assumed that any entity (be 
it an individual, a community, or a collective) which is able to be a ‘private owner’ of 
property under Nepali law is able to own an Ancient Monument under this Act. 
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located within their jurisdiction and forwarding the details of those objects to the 
department of archaeology.  
 
Citing preservation as the goal, the government retains the right to prevent "misuse or any 
kind of ill-treatment" of sacred sites that are either of archaeological importance or are 
under the supervision of the government as described in this Act. Furthermore, the Act 
stipulates that any person may enter a religious site if they wish to do so provided they do 
not disturb "the religious feeling of the concerned person or the traditional practice"; this 
includes privately owned sacred sites. The imposition of "improper restrictions" on entry 
into sacred sites can result in a fine. Specifically, the Chief Archaeological Officer has 
the power "to inspect as to whether or not the statue of the God or Goddess that is being 
worshiped is being kept properly". If they determine it is not, they "may cause it to be 
adequately preserved". No suit can be filed against government employees for actions 
performed under the powers vested in the Act. 
 
Theft or vandalism of an ancient monument results in a fine of 25,000 to 100,000 rupees 
(€206 to €826) on top of the valuation of the monument and 5 to 15 years in prison. Theft 
or vandalism of an archaeological object results in a fine of 5,000 to 100,000 rupees (€41 
to €826) on top of the valuation of the object and up to 5 years in prison. Objects covered 
by the Act may not be exported or even transferred from one place to another within 
Nepal without prior government consent. Anyone in possession of an object that is over 
100 years old, even objects inherited via families, must register with the government, 
except in such cases where the objects are Kul Devata, family gods22. Fines for not 
registering objects range from 500 to 5000 rupees (€4 to €40) and failure to pay the fine 
may result in government seizure of the object with no payment made to the owner. 
There can be no legal trade in objects over 100 years old. Individuals who offer 
                                                     
22 It is unclear why Kul Devata, which translates as ‘family god’, are not required to be 
registered with the government. In Hinduism, Kul Devata protect particular family lines and 
the worship of Kul Devata can span generations. They are conceived of as a family’s protector 
and the family god belongs to the family as much, perhaps, as the family belongs to the 
family god. It may that the private and family-specific nature of the physical Kul Devata 
warranted them a ‘special lack of protection’, under the Act, but without guidance on this 
exception, this remains speculation. 
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information that leads to an arrest and guilty verdict for violations of the Act are entitled 
to ten percent of the fine imposed. 
 
Ultimately, the Act proclaims the government's power to make all decisions related to 
heritage sites and objects. Although the government allows for private ownership of 
monuments and related objects, owners are stripped of all rights regarding modifications, 
transfer, movement, and, in the case of religious artefacts, acceptable use. To put it 
simply, The Ancient Monument Preservation Act seeks to apply a state-controlled 
international standard of preservation to Nepal's complicated and contested heritage 
space, the most contested of which relate to sacred sites and objects. 
 
Sacred sites and adversarial policy 
The continued focus on religious sites in the Act reflects the sacred nature of much of 
Nepal's heritage, but also signifies that religious heritage is what the Government tends to 
have the least control over. The government, thus, can force the non-state caretakers of 
religious sites to enter into a state-defined management plan and to allow state officials 
(and, in essence, anyone) access to all sacred sites even when this violates access 
restrictions as mandated by religious observances. It can also determine if idols are being 
improperly cared for, and in theory if it decides that active worship is harming the piece, 
it can order preservation or removal. Violation of any of these directives results in fines 
or object seizure. The government's right to impose international preservation models on 
religious heritage sites, then, supersedes the active cultural functions of those sites which 
may involve forms of worship that are seen as destructive (e.g. feeding the statues or 
covering them with pigment) or the religious needs of owners and community members. 
 
This forced yielding to government determination places communities sometimes in an 
adversarial role against the state, and this friction is made more salient by ongoing 
political issues in the recent history of the country’s regimes that might be summarized as 
close to a generalized cynicism in respect of the government’s legitimacy and good 
intentions - which spills over into the heritage security issue. The Act acknowledges that 
communities may oppose state-level heritage preservation measures and clearly spells out 
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that the state wins such disputes. Community rights to heritage are approached as lesser 
than the state's right to heritage within the law, and the state is cast as the enforcer of the 
law and the appropriate body to control and reprimand illicit activity. Strangely, the 
inventorying of objects and sites covered by this Act is left to local authorities, 
community members who one may assume might be the least willing to violate social 
norms related to access to sacred sites and photography of scared objects. This likely 
accounts for Nepal's uneven official registering of sacred art and exposes the Act's 
inherent weakness: it does not protect the intangible and social heritage of these sacred 
cultural sites, rather it subverts them. Any aspect of site or object security that is created 
and maintained by traditional and non-preservational use (some aspects of the extant web 
of informal social control that surrounds sites-in-use, in other words) is not approached as 
valid at a state level, and are likely not officially recorded or supported. 
 
Nepal’s informal heritage protection reality 
Informally, protection and security at sacred sites in Nepal are are a function of the long-
standing social and cultural uses of these sites. Sometimes this fills gaps in the structure 
of protection provided under the Ancient Monuments Protection Act, and in some cases it 
challenges the law’s authority. 
 
The types of non-state level security patterns that are observable at Nepali sacred sites 
include decisions made by community members or religious care takers either without 
consulting the government heritage authorities or in violation of their orders. This is a 
‘replacement’ effect, in our schema: where community level controls replace, supersede, 
circumvent or resist official policy. These usually relate to changes in the physical fabric 
of the sacred heritage site, such as the installation of protective screens, locks, walls, and 
other security features in a manner that is considered to violate best practices in Western-
style heritage preservation. It may also include the refusal to add security features such as 
those listed above in violation of government orders, placing emphasis on continued 
access to sacred objects and spaces. Beyond the religious argument for such access, it 
may be argued that the physical presence of devotees within sacred spaces prevents theft 
(on which see our theoretical notes on guardianship below). In other cases, communities 
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and religious leaders may bar government access to sacred sites, arguing that under the 
Act, these inspections may lead to the removal of sacred art to museums. This action is 
perceived of as theft, and prevention of government removal as securing the deities. 
 
Beyond direct and knowing violation of the government heritage protection framework in 
favor of community-defined security, a significant amount of sacred site protection in 
Nepal comes from actions beyond the Act. This is the situation we refer to as 
‘complementarity’ between the official and the community crime prevention regimes. 
The cultural uses of many sacred Nepali sites ensure that they are monitored and that 
changes including theft and damage are noticed. Interaction with active shrines and 
temples begins in the early hours of the morning, with priests or members of the 
community performing puja (prayer ritual) to either invoke the deity or, in the case of 
temples where the deity resides, awake them in order to honor them. This first prayer, 
which also includes unlocking the temple or shrine if it is normally closed during the 
night, can happen as early as 3am and marks the start of a complete day of human 
presence at the site. Community members offer short prayers as they pass, others visit at 
various times for longer interactions with the deity, and priests perform their functions 
until the site is closed for the night. Thus the constant flow of people and the direct 
interaction that devotees have with the sites afford a sense of protection that limited 
government security under the Act cannot aspire to. 
 
Of course this is not the case for all Nepali heritage sites. Disused temples and shrines 
naturally do not have the benefit of protection via footfall and suspicious behavior or 
theft at these sites may not be detected for quite a long time. Some sites as well may have 
religious access restrictions, with only limited groups being allowed to view the deity or 
sacred item held within, potentially shielding theft or damage from detection. Yet others 
argue that these access restrictions are, in themselves, a form of protection: if potential 
sacred art thieves do not know what (if any) targets exist in a temple, they may be 
unlikely to rob the temple, especially if they are looking for certain types of antiquities. In 
both of these cases, and at sacred sites generally, communities and religious groups 
depend on the social stigma and the belief in divine punishment associated with sacred art 
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theft and destruction, in other words, potential thieves may fear the social or religious 
penalties of theft. This is evidenced by several cases, recorded by the authors, of thieves 
returning stolen sacred art to temples, believing that 'bad luck' and other tragedies in their 
lives had their source in the theft. Such guilt or 'bad luck' returns are also possibilities in 
two recent idol theft cases.23 
 
It is clear that the state heritage protection structure does not reach these local, social, and 
cultural security activities. Not only are they not protected under the law, they are directly 
challenged in key passages of the government's primarily legislative tool. Replacement 
and complementarity in the interface between official and informal control models can 
both therefore exist within a context characterized by some tension between the top-down 
and bottom-up structures identified, and in the issue of erosion of informal social controls 
by perhaps ill-advised state interventions, there is more tension still. 
 
The earthquake and aftermath 
The 2015 earthquake destroyed significant areas of the important heritage sites of the 
Kathmandu Valley. To cite one example out of hundreds, the Kasthamandap, a 16th 
century pagoda-style temple said to be built from the wood of a single tree and from 
which the city of Kathmandu gets its name, completely collapsed and, essentially, no 
longer exists. Even the gods, it has been said, lost their homes in the quake. 
 
After the quake, noting the fragile security situation that accompanied the inevitable 
social upheaval and physical destruction, fears were widely expressed for the exposure of 
cultural heritage sites to looting.24 As previously stated, there is a strong international 
demand for Nepali art and a market for potentially looted sacred statuary. Following the 
earthquake, it seemed reasonable to assume that official guards and caretakers would 
leave sacred sites unattended. That police and military officials would be concerned with 
the pressing need to save people trapped in the rubble rather than deal with preventing 
                                                     
23 Kathmandu Post, "500-year-old conch stolen."; Kathmandu Post, "Four-faced Shiva idol found at 
Bhaktapur." 
24 e.g. AFP, "After damage"; Deutsche Presse Agentur, "Looters prowl"; Many, "Protecting the 
Ruins". 
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looting and theft. That community members wouldn't be keeping an eye out. That sacred 
art thieves would identify this as their big chance. 
 
Fortunately, however, the potential for despoliation manifested in these fears did not in 
fact materialize. During informal interviews with residents as well as local and 
government officials we conducted just under three months after the earthquake, all 
reported that the immediate public reaction to the earthquake was to save: to pull people 
out of the rubble, then pull gods out of the rubble. The form and organization that this 
salvage took differed greatly from site to site. In Patan, for example, sacred objects from 
in and around the heavily damaged Durbar Square area were brought in to the courtyard 
area of the Patan Museum with the help and expertise of the Kathmandu Valley 
Preservation Trust. In Bhaktapur, objects from damaged sacred spaces were also brought 
in to the local museum, and architectural elements were also preserved in an unused 
covered palace structure and in a shed owned by the Rabindra Puri foundation. At each, 
security was quickly established, usually by community members, and sacred art was 
protected from theft and, when possible, further earthquake related damage. In some 
locations the military and police participated in art salvage operations, signifying a 
complementarity between levels of protection, but this support was not available 
everywhere and certainly was not available immediately. In a moment of crisis, then, 
security came largely from unofficial sources, from community, and this was therefore 
primarily a situation of replacement of state protection regimes with community informal 
social controls. 
 
Officially, in the Nepali year before the earthquake25 only four sacred art thefts were 
recorded by police,26 although it is likely that this figure is greatly below the number of 
actual heritage thefts in the year. In the year following the quake, as mentioned, there 
were none. At the time of writing, just over a year since the quake, we are beginning to 
again see sacred art theft from Nepali temples, for example: 
 
                                                     
25 The Nepali New Year falls in mid-April 
26 Bhattarai, "The Gods are still leaving." 
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 September 2015: a trident and a bell were stolen from a Shiva Temple in Ujjwal 
Tole, Pepsicola, Kathmandu.27 
 November 2015: a 500-year-old sacred conch shell was stolen from the Bhagwati 
Temple of Marbhung, Gulmi.28 
 December 2015: a 17th century idol of Digu Bhairav was stolen from the 
Balkumari temple in Digu Tole, Madhyapur Thimi, Bhaktapur.29 
 May 2016: two idols, at least one of them of Brahmayani, were stolen from the 
Brahmayani Temple at Taulachhe, Bhaktapur.30 
 August 2016: a four-faced Shiva idol stolen from an unknown location and 
concealed on the premises of the Chwanga Ganesh Temple in Bhaktapur.31 
 August 2016: two idols stolen from a temple in Naudobahal, Lalitpur which were 
subsequently recovered with three arrests made.32 
 
There is speculation emerging that the onset of these new post-quake thefts is related to 
some of the lasting effects of the earthquake. While discussing the theft of the Dighu 
Bhairav statue in December 2015, Bhesh Narayan Dahal, the Director General of the 
Department of Archaeology, stated that sacred art theft had increased since the 
earthquake, saying that "There have been incidents of antiques that were stolen and left 
lying around, and also of the police intercepting sales and negotiations in the past three 
months."33 He believes that the thefts were due to reduced security and went further to 
say that 50 to 100 "items of archaeological importance" are stolen each year, but that law 
enforcement may not always be notified of the theft. In discussing the idol thefts from the 
Brahmayani temple, police stated that "it became easier for the thieves to lift the statues 
from the temple as local people living around the temple had migrated elsewhere 
following the 2015 earthquake".34 
 
                                                     
27 The Himalayan, "4 Theft Cases Reported in Capital." 
28 Kathmandu Post, "500-year-old conch stolen." 
29 Ojha, "Police draw blank in idol theft case."; Bhattarai, "The Gods are still leaving." 
30 Samiti, " Ancient Brahmayani Statues Stolen". 
31 Kathmandu Post, "Four-faced Shiva idol found at Bhaktapur." 
32 Kathmandu Post, "Police recover 400-yr old stolen idols." 
33 Quoted in Bhattarai, "The Gods are still leaving." 
34 Samiti, " Ancient Brahmayani Statues Stolen". 
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Although it is early to speculate about a specific pattern of post-earthquake sacred art 
theft in Nepal, the observations of both state-level archaeological officials and local 
police regarding security raise important questions about the true nature of heritage site 
security in Nepal. Is it the state that protects these sites from theft, sites that the 
government legally claims the right to preserve, or is it the informal networks of 
individual and community use that protect them? It appears that the answer is that it is the 
underlying constant presence of community level informal social controls that 
underwrites the site preservation reality.  
 
Sometimes, as happened immediately post-quake at a few of the internationally 
significant world heritage sites, the state can saturate the area with agents of formal 
control and thereby replace or complement the usual community protections. At the 
majority of other sites which do not reach such heights of world heritage status, the 
community crime control regime performed its function in an accelerated way in the 
immediate aftermath of the disaster. Now, as the earthquake damage has led to 
incremental community displacement away from some sites, those local controls have 
dissipated and thefts are increasing. The accentuated state response in the immediate 
aftermath has subsided to the point that now the usual regime has been largely reinstated, 
and missing the community-level complementarity necessary to enable this regime to 
achieve purchase on the ground, what rather seems to be happening is a process of further 
erosion of already attenuated informal social control, as the government’s ‘business as 
usual’ approach to inventory, situational crime prevention, and removal of sacred objects 
to museums clashes with what is left of the community’s various attempts to use, and 
therefore protect, idols and shrines. 
 
The theoretical landscape for replacement, complementarity and erosion of forms of 
control 
Informal social control is therefore at the core of the apparent explanation for the pattern 
of post-quake site protection and then the diminution in that protection and the rise of 
incidents of theft. As a central component of the Routine Activities Theory, ‘the capable 
guardian against crime serves by simple presence to prevent crime, and by absence to 
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make crime more likely’.35 In this well-known schema, ‘guardians’ supervise ‘suitable 
targets’ thereby discouraging crime against them through surveillance, and intervention 
where necessary. The crux of the theory is that while guardians can of course intervene 
actively to prevent crime, in most situations it is simply their visible or known presence 
that operates to discourage would-be offenders. Ritual use of sacred heritage sites can 
provide this visible display of guardianship and therefore protect the sites against thefts.  
 
There is more to it than that, though. Cultural practices at sacred sites bind community 
members into forms of worship that embed the religious value of the component parts of 
the site in the collective consciousness of the local community. Therefore, as well as 
discouraging crime by the kind of informal social control envisaged by day-to-day 
guardianship in Routine Activities Theory, the manifestation and reinforcement of a 
socially constructed respect for the sites-in-use can alter the perceptions of local 
community site users. This is less about capable guardianship than it is about social 
perceptions of the suitability of the target, and perhaps the third issue in the Routine 
Activities triad, the motivation of offenders. Objects that might otherwise be seen as 
unsecured, valuable, portable, attractive targets come instead to be seen as inviolable, 
practical and vital community foci. So there are various levels on which the daily 
religious routines we have observed in Nepal protect cultural objects against crime, all of 
which are aspects of both the active and the passive implications of the concept of 
informal social control, including collective efficacy, and the ideological consensus 
around the social meaning of sacred objects.  
 
In respect of the first issue above, informal social control, the concept of the ‘place 
manager’ has been developed by Eck,36 and subsequently integrated into the broader 
theory of Routine Activities.37 Felson divides responsibility for place management into: 
(a) personal, (b) assigned, (c) diffuse and (d) general types of responsibility, 
corresponding in order to (a) places you own or use, (b) places you are employed to 
protect, (c) places you and others work in and share a responsibility to maintain, and 
                                                     
35 Felson, "Those Who Discourage Crime." 
36 Eck and Weisbud, "Crime Places in Crime Theory". 
37 Felson, "Those Who Discourage Crime." 
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finally (d) bystanders and other casual users of places. It is clear that personal 
responsibility for place management and protection against crime is one of the most 
powerful of these operational categories of social control. It is also apparent that the 
integration of shrines and other sacred places into everyday community life can imbue 
them with the requisite sense of ‘personal’ meaning such as to support their protection by 
community members on this level: ‘extra emphasis is given to personal ties, which impels 
more responsibility than any of the other three categories… primacy decreases in this 
order: personal, assigned, diffuse and general responsibility’.38 
 
In respect of the second issue - what we have called the ideological consensus around the 
social meaning of sacred objects - we can observe that while this certainly underlines 
much routine cultural practice in Nepal, it appears to have taken on a particularly 
heightened salience in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. Here, local 
communities mobilized to ‘save’ their gods, in a proactive and symbolic effort that rests 
on but goes well beyond the normal emotions of daily worship. Parallels can be drawn 
here to observations made by Randall Collins on the topic of ‘rituals of solidarity and 
security’ in the wake of the 9/11 attack in New York. He identifies four phases of group 
solidarity as a response to ‘conflict’, or one might equally say perhaps, disaster. These 
are: 
 
1. An initial few days of shock and idiosyncratic individual reactions to attack; 
2. One to two weeks of establishing standardized displays of solidarity symbols; 
3. Two to three months of high solidarity plateau; and 
4. Gradual decline toward normalcy in six to nine months.39 
 
In very broad outline, this model and timeline seems quite instructive in helping to 
understand our case study. In terms of the more nuanced specifics of the theory, there are 
items which we would need to discuss, amend, manipulate, and so on at greater length 
than would be valuable here. However, the general proposition is valuable and relevant 
                                                     
38 Felson, "Those Who Discourage Crime." 
39 Collins, "Rituals of Solidarity and Security." 
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for our purposes: that community level emotional responses to crisis are dynamic 
processes with particular and somewhat generalizable ‘shapes in time… that sweep 
people up at one moment and bring them down at another’.40 
 
Conclusion 
The protection of culturally important heritage sites against theft in a particular crisis 
moment after a natural disaster is hardly the first context that springs to mind for a useful 
case study of the relationship between formal and informal social controls. In this 
research we have gathered data that has allowed us to make some relatively broad 
observations about the ‘shapes’ of group response to crisis which Collins has written 
about in another context, and to consider the relationship of those shapes to both the 
official government control regime for site protection and preservation, and some of the 
criminological theory which supports an explanation of the patterns of crime prevention 
we have observed. In the heuristics of replacement, complementarity and erosion we have 
considered the complexity of relationships between formal and informal control in this 
particular context, and essentially observed that the state’s regime is less important in 
practice for the majority of sites than the community’s routine activities are, that this has 
been especially true in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, and that the longer 
term effects of the disaster on the dilution of these community level controls is only now 
beginning to become apparent.  
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